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CONTRACT
A Physician Entering Into a Contractual Agreement With
Expressed Compensation Risks Is Bound By the Contract Terms
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida,
Jacksonville Division, held a physician who enters into an agreement
dictating his compensation is bound by the terms of the agreement.1
The plaintiff entered into a Specialty Care Physician Agreement
with North Florida Physicians Association (the Association) to provide
plastic and reconstructive surgery services.- Defendant, Mission
Health, later entered into a joint venture agreement with the
Association to provide health services to various HMOs.3 The
agreement between Mission Health and the Association provided the
defendant with monthly premiums from -lIMOs in exchange for
medical services.4 The agreement further provided compensation for
participating physicians, including the plaintiff, based on a method of
capitation, which prescribed a predetermined monthly payment based
on the number of new patients seen per month.5
In 1989, the defendant filed Chapter 11 Bankruptcy.6  The
plaintiff-physician subsequently filed a claim against Mission Health in
the amount of $50,697.86, which he later reduced to $47,964.53, for
services performed.7  Mission Health countered with a claim and
reconciliation worksheet totaling $6,219.10 for plaintiffs services.s
Plaintiff-physician filed a response alleging improper compensation,
partial compensation, unjustifiable rejection of some claims, and lack
of proper processing of his claims.9
The court's review of the agreement between the plaintiff and
Mission Health, as well as a physician compensation illustration
'In re Mission Health, Inc., 252 B.R. 223, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 890, at 230 (Fla. L
Weekly Fed. B. 318, July 12,2000).
21d. at 225.3 Id.
4Id.
5Id.
6In re Mission Health, Inc., 252 B.R. at 225.71d.
"Id.
91d.
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provided by the defendant, found the plaintiff incorrectly interpreted
the agreement to include a "run out" clause entitling him to twelve
months of compensation for each patient seen. 10
Looking to the language of the agreement, the court held the
plaintiffs compensation was limited to Mission Health's monthly pool
of available funds and was terminated when a patient disenrolled from
the plan or died. 1 The court sustained Mission Health's objection to
the balance of compensation alleged in the plaintiffs claim. 12
Accordingly, the court concluded the physician was only entitled to
payments as specifically set forth in the agreement.13 In re Mission
Health, Inc., 252 B.R. 223, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 890 (Fla. L. Weekly
Fed. B 318 July 12, 2000).
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
A Physician May Not Lose Her DEA Registration For
Recommending Marijuana to Terminally Ill Patients Where a
Bona-Fide Patient-Physician Relationship Exists
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California
held a class of physicians would not be punished for recommending
marijuana to terminally ill patients under prescribed guidelines. 14
Physicians filed a class action lawsuit challenging the
constitutionality of the federal government's policy of punishing
physicians who recommend marijuana pursuant to the California
Compassion Use Act of 1966.15 The Act allowed the use of marijuana
by seriously ill patients for medical purposes as recommended by
physicians who determined the patient's health would benefit from the
drug's use.16
'1O°.
1In re Mission Health, Inc., 252 B.R. at 229.
'
21d. at 230.
14Conant v. McCaffrey, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13024, at *40 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 7,
2000). 
'
51d. at *1.
'
6Id. at *2.
[Vol. 4:449
CASE BRIEFS
Physicians had to follow certain guidelines to prescribe marijuana,
including registration with the Attorney General.17 Shortly after the
passage of the Act, the Director of the Office of National Drug Control
Policy issued a mandate stating any physician's action of
recommending marijuana would lead to administrative revocation of
the physician's registration pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act,
which lists marijuana as a Schedule 1 prohibited drug. I8 The Drug
Administration further mandated a list of criteria for review of cases for
prosecution.19 A subsequent letter was issued by the Departments of
Justice and Health and Human Services to national and local
physicians, explaining that physicians were not prohibited from
discussing the risks and benefits of marijuana use with a patient within
the context of a legitimate physician-patient relationship.
2
The plaintiffs motioned for summary judgment and requested a
preliminary and permanent injunction against the Drug
Administration.21 The plaintiffs, who included physicians, patients,
and an organization comprised of people with AIDS or HIV related
illnesses, alleged the Administration's mandate and punishment
threatened open communication within the context of a bona-fide
physician-patient relationship, particularly for patients suffering from
cancer, AIDS, or other terminal diseases.
2Y
The court issued a preliminary injunction against the government
and denied the government's motion for summary judgment.23  The
court found the physicians would inevitably confront the government's
ban on marijuana recommendations during the course of their
obligations and treatments of their patients.24 The court further found a
direct threat of injury to the plaintiffs and the patients based on the
government's de-registration policy.2 5 To bar physicians from open
communication with patients regarding their medical judgments would
17Id. at *4.
'
8Conant, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13024, at *5.
'
91d. at *6.
201d. at *7.211d. at *16.
2Id.
23Conant, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13024, at *17.241d. at *22.
5Id. at *23.
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disable patient understanding and participation in their choices of
treatment.
26
The court held despite the government's legitimate interests in
controlling the flow of controlled substances, a bar on open
communication between physicians and their patients would
compromise treatment decisions and meaningful patient participation.27
The court used a balancing approach to rule on the side of
protecting sincere medical recommendations by physicians involved in
bona-fide patient relationships. 28  The court, however stipulated
physicians who issued insincere recommendations absent a medical
basis would be subject to Drug Enforcement Agency revocation.2 9 The
constitutional doubt of the Drug Administration's mandate, specifically
First Amendment rights as it related to the Administration's bar on
physician communication, led the court to grant partial summary
judgment to plaintiffs, as well as a permanent injunction against
revocation of class-member physicians' DEA registration. 30 Conant v.
McCaffrey, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13024 (Cal. Ct. App. September 7,
2000).
CRIME
Victim's Testimony, Together With Circumstantial Evidence of
Criminal Past, Was Sufficient to Prove Attempted Murder
The Court of Appeals of Louisiana held victim's testimony that
defendant gave her "a shot in the dark," together with circumstantial
evidence of prior criminal acts was sufficient to demonstrate defendant
intended victim's death.
31
Defendant physician had maintained an intimate relationship with
plaintiff nurse for ten years.32 During the relationship plaintiff became
261d. at *41.
27
rd.
28Conant, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13024, at *41.291d. at *47.
3Old. at *48.31State of Louisiana v. Schmidt, 2000 La.App. No. 99-1412 (Ct. App. La. 2000).
321d. at *3.
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pregnant four times, had three abortions, and gave birth once.33 Later
plaintiff attempted to discontinue the relationship, but defendant
became enraged.34  Circumstantial evidence demonstrated that
subsequent to the termination of their relationship, defendant raped
plaintiff on two occasions, became jealous when she dated other men,
and attempted to notify plaintiff's university that he had helped her
with assignments in the past.
35
On August 4, 1994, defendant drove to plaintiff's house and gave
her what she thought was a vitamin B-12 injection, but later found to be
an injection of HIV infected blood.36 Evidence was presented which
showed defendant had drawn blood from an HIV infected patient one
day before he injected plaintiff, but had made no record of that blood
draw.
37
Soon after plaintiff was given the injection she began having flu-
like symptoms. 3 Defendant tried to discourage plaintiff and plaintiff's
physician from having a HIV test done. 39 However, a test for HIV was
done, and plaintiff was found to be HIV positive.40 Evidence was
obtained that revealed none of plaintiffs prior suitors to be HIV
positive.41 The state subsequently charged defendant with attempted
second-degree murder, after which he was convicted and sentenced to
fifty years of hard labor.42 Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing
the state's evidence against him, and its theory of the case was limited
by the indictment and the bill of particulars.
The court held that when all the evidence presented was viewed in
a light most favorable to the prosecution a rational juror could have
found proof beyond a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt.43 In
particular, the state was required to demonstrate defendant had specific
intent to kll.44 Defendant argued that the HIIV positive patient from
33 d
34 Id
351d
36Schmidt, 2000 La.App. No. 99-1412, at *4.
37Id at *9.
"SId. at *6.
39Id. at *8.40Id.
41Schmidt, 2000 La.App. No. 99-1412, at *12.421d. at *1.431d at *44.
44Id.
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whom the blood had been drawn and injected into victim, was AZT-
sensitive, whereas the victim was AZT-resistant.4 5 However, testimony
was provided that this distinction was misleading as AZT sensitivity
and resistance differs in patients according to their mode of treatment.
46
Finally, the concealment of the jot book containing entries from the
dates in which the HIV positive blood was drawn was also indicative of
the attempted murder.47 This evidence, together with the fact that there
was no other reasonable explanation for defendant's infection
supported the conclusion that defendant was guilty of second-degree
murder.4
8
The Court of Appeals concluded the evidence of defendant's past
criminal acts were properly admitted by the trial court, as they were not
used to demonstrate his character.49 Accordingly the conviction was
affirmed. 50 State of Louisiana v. Richard J. Schmidt, 2000 La. LEXIS
1872 (Ct. App. La. 2000).
DISCOVERY
Limited Discovery May Not Be Sufficient to Establish Physician
Employment Status Regarding Summary Judgment
The Supreme Court of Mississippi held where genuine issues of
material fact regarding a physician's employment status remain in
dispute, complete discovery is necessary.
51
Plaintiff's minor child died after a cardiac catheterization
performed by defendant physician at a state university medical center• • 52
(University). Plaintiff subsequently filed a medical malpractice suit
against defendant physician for negligence. 53 In response, defendant
physician filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff failed
451d.
46Schmidt, 2000 La.App. No. 99-1412, at *34.471d. at *40.4 1d. at *44.491d at *51-58.
501d. at *86.
-
51 mith v. Braden, M.D., 2000 Miss. Lexis 201, at 2 (Miss. Sup. Ct. Aug 24,2000).52Id.
531Id. at3.
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to meet the one-year statute of limitations set forth in the Tort Claims
Act of Mississippi (the Act) regarding state employees.54 The trial
court permitted only limited discovery on the issue of defendant
physician's employment status.,5 Plaintiffs request for further
discovery was denied, the court granting summary judgment in favor of
defendant after finding he was an employee of the University and
therefore protected under the one-year statute of limitations as defined
in the Act.56 Plaintiff appealed.57
On appeal, the higher court first addressed the issue of whether the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant
physician after permitting only limited discovery on the issue of his
employment status.58 Under the Act, if defendant physician was found
to be an employee of the University he would be immune from
litigation outside of the one year statute of limitations.,5 9 The court
applied a five-part test commonly used to determine employment status
of physicians for the purposes of liability under the Act."9 Finding
plaintiff had failed the five-part test, the court reversed the trial court's
decision and remanded the case for additional discovery.61 Smith v.
Braden, M.D., 2000 Miss. LEXIS 201, 1 (Miss. Supr. Ct., Aug. 24,
2000).
EQUITABLE RELIEF
Private Pharmacists Participating In Fee-For-Service Prescription
Drug Plans May Be Denied Equitable Relief Where Standard of
Access to Services Is Relative to the General Population of an Area
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held HMO Prescription Drug Plans did not violate the
Medicaid Act (the Act) where there was a decrease in access and
"Id.
55M.
56Smith, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 201, at 5.571d
-"Id at 6.
591d. at 7.
"'Smith, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 201, at 31.611d. at 30.
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services, since the Act required a standard of access to services relative
to the general population, rather than absolute access to services. 62
The Pennsylvania Pharmacists Association (the Association) is a
non-profit organization representing four hundred and forty
independent pharmacies and other pharmacies participating in
Pennsylvania's Medical Assistance Program.63 The Association
subsequently entered into provider agreements with the Pennsylvania
Department of Public Welfare (the Department) allowing
reimbursement to the pharmacists for brand name and generic
prescription drug coverage.6
In 1997, the Department obtained a waiver from the Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA) to implement a Medicaid Managed
Care Program called HealthChoices. 65 Pursuant to the terms of the
waiver, the Department contracted with HMOs to administer the new
Program. 66  As the HMOs contracted with pharmacy managers to
administer the HealthChoices Plan and begin implementation, the
outpatient pharmacy benefit fee-for-service rates began to decrease.
67
The Pharmacists filed suit against the Secretary of the Department
alleging the decrease in pharmacy rates led to inconsistencies in
efficiency, economy, and quality of care among patients in the Medical
Assistance Program, as well as decreased access to retail pharmacies.
68
The pharmacists further alleged the decrease in access and services
violated the Medicaid Act.
69
The court found the Department's formulation of its HMO
reimbursement plan was not arbitrary or capricious as to adequate and
equal access to services for non-member (fee-for-service) patients. 70 In
defense of its procedures, the Department provided information
concerning its 30/60 standard, which involved a requirement that the
HMO have at least two participating pharmacies within 30 minutes
62pa. Pharm. Ass'n v. Houstoun, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7807, at *32 (Pa. D. & C. June 7,
2000).63Id. at *2.
6Id. at *4.
6 1d. at *4.66 id.
67Pa. Pharm Ass'n, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7807, at *4.681d. at *5.
691dt.
701d at *10.
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travel time in urban areas, and within 60 minutes travel time in rural
areas.7 1 The court found the 30/60 standard complied with the
provisions of the Medicaid Act.72 The court reasoned the Act required
a standard of access to services relative to the general population rather
than absolute access to services.7 3 The court further held the
Department met its burden of proving equal access to services by
drawing comparisons between the number of pharmacies accessible to
privately insured members versus members using an HMO plan.7 4 The
court specifically favored the comparison standard used by the
Department over the pharmacists' higher standard of fee-for-service
comparison.
75
The court concluded a twenty-percent drop in pharmacies
available for fee-for-service participants did not prove a significant
disparity in access or services to patients.76 Since the pharmacists failed
to establish the Department's violation of the Medicaid Act, the court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Pa. Pharm.
Ass'n v. Houstoun, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXS 7807 (Pa. D. & C. June 7,
2000).
ERISA
State Statutes That Regulate Insurance Are Saved From Federal
Preemption Under ERISA
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) did not preempt
a state statute since the state statute regulated insurance.77
Plaintiffs were seven Health maintenance Organizations (HMO's)
licensed under the laws of Kentucky, and a non-profit association
711d.
72Pa. Pharm. Ass'n, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7807, at *11.
73Id. at *12.
741d. at *22.
7"Id at *23.
76 d. at *25.
77Kentucky Assn of Health Plans v. George Nichols, No. 98-6308, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 22528 (Sept. 7,2000).
20011
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organized to promote business interest of its HMO members.78
Plaintiffs sued the commissioner of the Kentucky Department of
Insurance, stating the statute should be preempted by ERISA.79 The
court found there was no preemption because the statute regulated
insurance under ERISA's savings clause.
80
The court stated the Act's reference to ERISA plans, and its
exclusion of self-insured ERISA plans from its coverage, clearly
brought the statute within the "reference to" ERISA prong established
by the Supreme Court to determine preemption.8' Furthermore, the
statute's "connection with" such plans offered an alternative basis for
such preemption.82 The court found the most important aspect was
whether, from a common sense point of view, the contested statute
regulated insurance. 83 The court found the statute clearly regulated
insurance and met the common sense analysis.
84
Therefore, the judgment of the district court that the state statute
regulated insurance under the common sense test and was not subject to
federal preemption was affirmed.85 Kentucky Association of Health
Plans v. George Nichols, No. 98-6308, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 22528
(Sept. 7, 2000).
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974
Preempts a State Examiner Board's Regulation of
Coverage Determination By Physician
Acting For Third Party Health Care Administrator
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas held
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974
preempted a state medical examiner board's regulation of a coverage
781d at *2.
791d
sold.
"'Id at *5.
82KentuckyAss'n of Health Plans, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 22528, at *29.831d. at *34.
4Id.
851d.
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determination by a physician acting for a third party health care
administrator.
86
Plaintiff medical director, employed by a third party health care
administrator, denied coverage for nursing services to a minor in order
to provide respite to the parents. S7 The medical director identified this
type of care as custodial care, excluded under the insurance plan.30
Defendants, members of the state medical examiners board (Board) and
its executive director, filed a complaint against the medical director
after they conducted an investigation and concluded that plaintiff had
erred in his determination.89 Plaintiff claimed the Board's actions of
conducting its own benefit determinations and assessing penalties and
fines against a third party administrator and fiduciary were preempted
under ERISA.90 Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.9' Defendants also claimed Congress did not
intend to preempt a state's regulation of medical practice.92
The court denied defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.93 It found analysis of ERISA preemption consisted
of (1) a presumption that Congress generally does not intend to preempt
state laws; (2) a focus on the objectives of ERISA as a guide to
Congressional intent on preemption; and (3) an analysis of the effect of
the state law on the ERISA plan at issue.94 The court also found the
Supreme Court had addressed two instances where ERISA preempts
state law: (1) where state law mandates employee benefit structures of
their administration, and (2) where state law provides alternative
enforcement mechanisms to those provided by ERISA.95
The court reasoned the Board's action of replacing the medical
director's decision with its own judgment conflicted with ERISA.9"
The Board's regulation of the medical director's determination
86United Healthcare Ins. Co., v. Levy, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13276, at *1-2 (N.D. Tex.
2000).'Id. 
at *3.
ssId
S9 d. at *5.
9
'Id. at *6.
91United Healthcare Ins Co, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13276, at *7.
9id.
93Id at *23.
94Id. at *15.
9SSd. at *15-16.
95UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co, U.S. Dist LEXIS 13276, at *16.
2001]
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permitted the definition of "custodial care" to change.97 Defendants'
action therefore provided an alternative enforcement mechanism. 98 The
Board was trying to discipline the medical director because it disagreed
with his decision, and this action was preempted. 99
Therefore the Court denied defendants' motion to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, finding ERISA preempted a state medical
examiner board's regulation of a coverage determination by a physician
acting for a third party health care administrator."0  United Healthcare
Ins. Co. v Levy, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13276 *1 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
EXPERT WITNESS
'The Statutory Provision That an Expert Medical Witness Spend
the Majority of His Professional Time In the Practice Or Teaching
of Medicine Is Not Contradictory to an Expert Witness Who
Spends His Time Teaching Medicine On a Part Time Basis
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan,
Southern Division held a witness could testify as an expert even though
he was not practicing medicine and was only teaching medicine on a
part time basis.'
10
In a medical malpractice suit, plaintiff claimed physician was
negligent in failing to diagnose and treat plaintiffs coronary artery
disease, which lead to plaintiff patient's cardiac arrest and death. 102 At
trial, the defendant made a motion to strike plaintiffs expert witness
because he was unqualified under the Michigan law that required an
expert medical witness to be actively engaged in clinical practice, or to
devote his professional career to teaching medicine at an accredited
health professional school. 10 3 The court was faced with the question of
971d. at *17.
9
'1d. at *18.
991d. at *21.
'O'1d at* 1-*2.
01Estate of Helen Gawel v. Ivan C. Schatten, M.D., 109 F.Supp. 2d 719 (E.D. Mich.
2000).
'O1°d. at 720.03 d
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what constitutes "a majority of his or her professional time" under the
statute to be a valid expert witness."'
10 4
The court found the purpose of the statute was to discourage
expert witnesses who were no longer active in the medical profession
from spending their professional time as expert witnesses.'0 5 The court
wished to deter "professional expert witnesses" in order to protect the
veracity of the judicial system.10 6 Although the expert witness in
question was retired, he taught eight to ten hours a week at an
accredited university and sPent an additional thirty hours a week
preparing for his lectures.' The court reasoned that the legislative
intent was not to require full time employment.103 Instead, the court
stated the expert must spend more of his professional time teaching or
practicing medicine and not testifring.
10 9
The court found questions as to the time the physician spends in
the profession each week would go to the credibility of the expert
witness and not to his qualification." 0 Accordingly, the court denied
the motion to strike the expert witness!" Estate of Helen Gawel it Ivan
C. Schatten, M.D., 109 F. Supp.2d. 719 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION
There Is No Specific Jurisdiction For a Corporation In Its
Principal State of Business If the Corporation Contracts With
Another State and Performs Predominantly In That Other State
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held there
was no specific jurisdiction for a Health Partner corporation in its
'4Id. at 722.051Id. at 723.
'
06Gawel, 109 F. Supp.2d at 723.
107 d.
IOSd
"
'
09Id. at 724.
1 1Old. at 725.
"
1Gavel, 109 F. Supp.2d at 720.
2001]
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principal state of business when the contract with another corporation
calls for performance that is predominantly in another state. 112
Diamond Healthcare, a Virginia corporation, entered into a
contract with an Ohio health maintenance organization (HMO) to
provide partial-hospitalization services for the elderly." 3 The HMO
terminated the contract two years later.114 Diamond Healthcare filed for
breach of contract, and the lIMO asked for dismissal based on lack of
personal jurisdiction. 15
The court found appellee's contractual relationship with appellant,
which called for performance predominantly in Ohio, did not create
constitutionally sufficient minimum contacts with Virginia to subject it
to suit there. 116 During negotiations representatives of the parties met in
Ohio but never in Virginia, signed the agreement in Ohio, and agreed
that the project would be run under Ohio law, even though parts of the
contract could be performed in Virginia. 117 The court found these
reasons undercut the argument that the appellant could reasonably
anticipate being taken to Virginia court, or that they deliberately
exercised the privilege of undertaking contractual activity in
Virginia. 118 In short, the court found appellee directed its activities
under the contract with Ohio, not that the HMO directed its activities
towards Virginia.' 19 Likewise the court was not convinced that frequent
communications and management activities between the Virginia office
and Ohio were sufficient for minimum contacts, finding no authority to
support the supposition that interactions between headquarters and its
own employees in the field across state lines formed a sufficient
connection. 120 Accordingly, the court granted appellant's motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 12 1 Diamond Healthcare of
112Diamond Healthcare of Ohio v. Humility of Mary Health Partners, No. 00-1006, 2000
U.S. App. LEXIS 24908, at *1 (4t" Cir. Oct. 5,2000).i1 Id at *2.
151d. at *2-3.
"
61d. at *3-4.
'
7Diamond, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 24908, at *6-*9.
11d. at *11.
"
91d. at *12.
'
201d. at *13.12id.
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Ohio v. Humility of Mary Health Partners, No. 00-1006, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 24908, at *1 (4' Cir. Oct. 5, 2000).
Health Maintenance Organization Does Not Have to Provide a
Member With Home Health Care Service Unless the Member
Establishes That the Benefits Sought Are Medically Necessary
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held a health
plan member had to establish that home care was medically necessary
in order for a health maintenance organization (HMO) to cover the
costs.
12 2
Plaintiff and his wife were members of a health benefits plan
under HMO of New Jersey, doing business as U.S. Healthcare
(USH).123 Plaintiff's wife suffered from multiple sclerosis, and as the
illness worsened plaintiff requested that defendant provide home care
coverage for his wife.124 USH denied the request due to the higher
costs of home care as opposed to a nursing facility.121 The plaintiff
brought the request to the USH's grievance and appeal system and was
again denied. 12  The plaintiff then brought his claim to the Executive
Advisory Committee of USH (the Committee), which did not respond
until the plaintiff's third letter to the Committee.12 7 USH responded by
again denying plaintiff's request for home health care coverage and
informing plaintiff that USH would no longer review the case.
2 3
Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging
entitlement to private nursing, and seeking reimbursement for past and
future costs of his wife's private nursing. 12 9 Plaintiff further claimed
USH violated their statutory fiduciary duties to his wife and he sought
reimbursement for attorneys' fees.
130
'2Juliano v. Health Maintenance Org. of N. J., Inc., 221 F.3d 279 (2A Cir. 2000).
23Id. at 282.
1241d.
251d. at 2S4.
1261d.
'
27Juliano, 221 F.3d at 284.
1291d.
13 Id.
2001]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW[
The district court rendered partial summary judgment in favor of
UIHS. 13 1 The court ruled that under the agreement between plaintiff
and UIHS, home care had to be "medically necessary" and the plaintiff,
having the burden of proof, had not met that burden. 13 2 The court
subsequently rejected plaintiffs claim for equitable relief.133 The court
then ordered a trial limited to the issue of whether plaintiff was entitled
to reimbursement for the costs of the skilled nursing facility care
offered by USH. 134 On this issue, the court held that in order to be
entitled to nursing facility benefits, plaintiff had to "(1) select [a skilled
nursing facility] site from those suggested by [USH]; and (2) have [the
primary care physician] examine his wife and provide a written referral
for the patient to have [skilled nursing facility] care." 135
The district court later ruled plaintiff was entitled to nursing
facility benefits, but denied plaintiffs motion for attorney's fees and
plaintiff subsequently appealed. 
136
The Court of Appeals stated plaintiff was required to establish that
home care was "medically necessary" to be entitled to home care.
137
The court found USH's failure to mention medical necessity did not
constitute a waiver or estoppel. 138 The court further held USH was not
required to provide home health care merely because the plaintiff
requested it, but because it was "prescribed or directed" by plaintiffs
primary care physician.
139
Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the lower court for
determination of whether plaintiffs physician had either prescribed
home care, or would have done so had he known that such a
prescription was required in order for the plaintiff to be reimbursed the
home care costs. 140 Juliano v. Health Maintenance Org. of N.J., Inc.,
221 F.3d 279 (2 nd Cir. 2000).
'
31id at 285.
"
2Juliano, 221 F.3d at 285.
i331d.1341d
1351d.
361d. at 285-86.37Juliano, 222 F.3d at 288.
1311d. at 287.
1391d. at 290.
1401d at 282.
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Claim of Negligence On a Healthcare Company's Determination
That Physical Therapy Was Not Medically Necessary Is Actually a
Claim to Recover Benefits and Is Preempted
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
held a claim of negligence on a healthcare company's determination
that physical therapy was not medically necessary, was actually a claim
to recover benefits due under the health insurance plan and was
preempted. 141
Plaintiff was insured by United Healthcare Insurance Co. of
Illinois (United Healthcare). 142 United Healthcare paid for plaintiffs
physical therapy after she underwent dental surgery.14 United
Healthcare later refused to continue to pay for the physical therapy,
finding it to be medically unnecessary. 44 When plaintiffs condition
worsened after she stopped going to therapy, United Healthcare
decided to re-institute payment for the therapy, which was now
ineffective.145  Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against United
Healthcare claiming it negligently practiced medicine when it decided
the physical therapy was medically unnecessary.1 46 Plaintiff moved to
remand the case to state court.'
47
Plaintiff did not claim her physician was negligent, but rather that
the insurance company was negligent.14 s The court reasoned this was a
claim to recover benefits, rather than a claim of negligence from the
insurance company under an ERISA plan.149 The court stated that a
claim under state law was preempted under §502(a)."" Plaintiff's
reliance on §514(a), which preempted state laws that "relate to any
141SchusteriC v. United Healthcare Ins. Co. of II1., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1302, at *1
(N.D. Ill. 2000).1421d. at *1.
1431d. at *1-2.
44Id. at *2.
1451d.
146Schusteric, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13021, at *2.
1471d. at *1.
1411d. at *3.
149Id. at *4.
'sold. at *3 (citing Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482-S9 (7t Cr.
1996)).
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employee benefit plan" was misplaced because §514(a) determined
whether ERISA "serves as a defense to the state law claim."' 5 1
The court denied plaintiff's motion to remand since her negligence
claim was actually a claim to recover benefits due under the health
insurance plan, and was therefore preempted. 152 Schusteric v. United
Healthcare Ins. Co. of Ill., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXS 13021 *1 (ND. Ill.
2000).
Failure to Meet the Standing Requirements of Injury, Traceability,
and Redressability May Result In the Dismissal of a Claim
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, held
plaintiff chiropractic association (the Association) did not have
standing to challenge defendant Secretary of Health and Human
Services' report to Congress, and directed supplemental memoranda be
filed on the issue ofjurisdiction.153
Plaintiff Association alleged certain chiropractic services were not
being made available to Medicare recipients as required under
statute. 154  The Association complained that because of defendant's
regulations Medicare recipients were denied access to manual
manipulations by chiropractors, and blamed the regulations on an anti-
chiropractic bias within the medical community. 55 1
The court held plaintiff lacked standing to bring its first count.
The count challenged a report submitted to Congress and its apparent
failure to make recommendations for changes to provide access to
chiropractic services for Medicare beneficiaries. 157 The court reasoned
the report held no legal significance and Congress was in no manner
required to follow conclusions made within the report. 15 This, the
'
5Schusteric, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13021, at *6-*7 (citing Rice v. Panchal, 65 F,3d
637, 639-40).
152Id at *8.
153Am. Chiropractic Ass'n, Inc. v. Shalala, 108 F.Supp. 2d 1, 5, 12 (Dist. Ct. D.C. 2000).
'54Id. at 3.
155Id.
'
56Id at 6.
157 id159Am. Chiropractic Ass'n, Inc., 108 F. Supp.2d I at 6.
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court determined, would not support plaintiffs standing.'5 9 As to the
other counts of the complaint, the court decided plaintiff had standing
to bring the claims. 6 o
On the issue of jurisdiction under the Medicare Act and the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA), the court held it could not
determine the administrative reviewability of the remaining counts of
plaintiffs claim without further consideration, and directed the parties
to submit supplemental memoranda addressing the issue.
161
The court declined to establish jurisdiction under the Mandamus
Act (the Act), stating that jurisdiction was to be a remedy under the Act
only if all other means of establishing jurisdiction were exhausted. 162
As such, the court had not spent all available resources for jurisdiction
and refused to invoke the Act without first considering the
supplemental memoranda it had ordered under the Medicare Act and
the APA.163  Accordingly, the court granted defendant's motion to
dismiss, finding plaintiff lacked standing.164 American Chiropractic
Ass'n, Inc. v. Shalala, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1 (Dist. Ct. D.C. 2000).
RICO Claim Against HM1Os Will Fail Without
Sufficient Establishment of Injury In Fact
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held a claim
against an health maintenance organization (lIMO) alleging the HMO
violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) by participating in a fraudulent advertising campaign failed
since appellants suffered no injury to business or property.165
Appellants filed a class action suit against appellee, Aetna's
Health Maintenance Organization Plan (the Plan).t ' Appellants
contended they were members of a class targeted by Aetna and induced
to enroll in Aetna's HMO plan as a result of Aetna's misrepresentations
1591d. See Glover River Org. v. Department of the Interior, 675 F.2d 251, 255 (IV, Cir.
1982); accord, Guerreo v. Clinton, 157 F.3d 1190, 1195 (91, Cir. 199S).
1601d. at 7.1611d. at 11.162 Id.
163An. Chiropractic Ass'n, Inc. 108 F. Supp. 2d at 11.
164Id.
165Maio v. Aetna Inc., 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 19172, at *1 (3Yd Cir. 2000).
1651d. at *4.
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regarding the benefits of the Plan.1 67 Appellants alleged such
misrepresentations were dispersed to every potential enrollee through
advertising campaigns, membership materials and the "HMO Plan
Member Handbook" in violation of RICO and state law.' 68 The district
court dismissed the appellants' RICO claims for failure to establish that
appellants had suffered a cognizable injury as required to state a claim
under RICO. 6 9
On appeal, the issue presented for determination by the court was
whether appellants had alleged a valid RICO injury to business or
property sufficient to withstand appellee's motion to dismiss' 70 In
review of this issue, the higher court was guided by precedent stating
that under RICO the moving party is entitled to standing only if he has
been injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting the
violation.17 1 Although appellants argued their claim was sufficient
since they were injured as a result of paying high premiums for
"inferior" health insurance, the court rejected this theory, finding no
proof had been established showing any appellant had sustained
negative medical consequences as a result of enrolling in the Plan.1
72
Furthermore, since appellants had failed to establish their medical care
had been compromised as a result of Aetna's supervisory decisions,
there was no basis for determining that the health insurance was worth
less than it cost. 173 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the district court. 174 MAZO v. Aetna, Inc., 2000 U.S. App.
LEX[S 19172 (3 rd Cir. 2000).
Where a Health Maintenance Organization's Actions
Are Not Directly Governed By a Federal Agency,
It Is Not Entitled to Federal Jurisdiction
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California
held when actions by a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) are
167Id.168Id. at *6.
'
691d at *20.
170Maio, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 19172, at *26.171,"d.
172 /Id. at *42.
173Id.
174 Id.
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not directly controlled by a federal agency, federal jurisdiction is
improper. 1
75
Plaintiffs, a class of HMO beneficiaries in California, brought an
action against an HMO, which terminated its medical services to
certain markets of the state. 176 Plaintiffs contended defendant IMO
violated California's unfair business and competition laws by
withdrawing its services. 177  Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1442,
defendant moved this action to federal court.178  Plaintiffs moved for
remand to state court, citing lack of federal jurisdiction. 179 The Court
analyzed two issues:
1) subject matter jurisdiction, and
2) appropriateness of removal of case to federal Court.
Defendants contended plaintiffs' claims subjected the case to
federal jurisdiction.8 0 Specifically, defendant pointed to authority
given by Congress to the Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA) to provide medical care to Medicare beneficiaries.' 8 '
However, such a connection only equates to Federal action where
support is established that "direct and detailed" control by a Federal
entity exists.182 Although defendant contended its advertisements were
reviewed by HCFA, a federal agency, direct control was still lacking
because such HCFA action was insufficient to prove the "nexus"
required for consideration as a federal action.
183
The court noted while HCFA is charged with regulating which
HMOs are eligible to receive Medicare contracts, the mere existence of
a Medicare contract did not deem any subsequent action by an IMO to
be under the direct or detailed control of a federal officer.'1 Thus,
175Green v. Aetna, U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12320, at *11 (D. Ca.
2000). 1761d. at *3.1771d
1791d. at *4.
""GGreen, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 12320, at *3.
lSld
"
'82Id. at *7.
'RId.
'AGreen, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12320, at *6.
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defendant's withdrawal of medical services was an independent
action.1
85
Next, the Court determined whether removal to federal court by
defendant was proper. 186 The court stated such removal is proper where
an action is "inextricably intertwined" with federal law.' 87 Defendant
asserted plaintiffs' claims were an inherent aspect of federal law
because they occurred as a mechanism of the Social Security Act.
88
However, the court reasoned while the Social Security Act governs the
review of Medicare claims, this aspect had little connection with
plaintiffs' allegation of decreased competition.' 89 Plaintiffs sought
damages regarding fraud and misrepresentation, each governed by state
law.190
Since the claims presented were not controlled under federal
regulation, the court found plaintiffs' allegations did not trigger federal
jurisdiction. 191 Accordingly, the Court granted plaintiffs' motion to
remand the case to state court.192 Green v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare,
Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXS 12320 (D. Ca. 2000).
INSURANCE
When Two Insurance Policies Conflict the Primary Insurance
Must Be Exhausted Before Excess Insurance Is Required to Pay
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held
primary insurance must be exhausted before excess insurance is
required to pay.
193
Two insurance companies disputed the allotment of insurance
coverage for a loss that occurred when the companies had overlapping
professional liability insurance policies which covered health
851d. at *8.
1861d
1871d
1881d.
""
9Green, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12320, at *8.
'91d. at *11.
1911d.1921Id.
193Executive Risk Specialty Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 106 F.Supp. 2d 181 (Dist.
Mass 2000).
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maintenance organization's (HMO) medical malpractice claim.' 94
Plaintiff, a medical malpractice insurer, filed action for
indemnification, contribution, equitable subrogation and attorney's
fees. 195
The lawsuit arose out of a medical malpractice action that claimed
the FMO's failure to approve a brain scan requested by an LMO's
patient's physician resulted in non-diagnosis of a brain aneurysm and
subsequent brain damage. 196 At the time the claim was made the HMO
had three managed care professional liabilities in place. 97 The parties
disputed whether the remaining amount of the settlement should be
covered by plaintiff or defendant insurance companys policy.193
Defendant insurance company refused to pay.'9 After plaintiff
insurance company learned its policy overlapped with that of the
defendant, the HMO asked plaintiff insurer to change the effective date
of its policy so that it would become effective when defendant
insurance policy expired or was cancelled. 0 0 Subsequent to this
request, the HMO made no further inquiry of plaintiff insurance
company concerning the HMO's planned action regarding the effective
date of its policy. 20
1
The court determined the outcome of the case by interpreting the
"other insurance" clause in defendant's policy.2 2 After determining
that both of the insurers were primary policy issuers, the court
concluded the "other insurance" clause in defendant's policy was
susceptible to more than one meaning, and it admitted extrinsic
evidence to find the purpose of the clause in question, the public policy,
and the transaction as a whole.20 3 Under the purpose, the court found
defendant did not intend to pay for the entire loss if other insurance was
available.20 4 Furthermore, public policy was against plaintiff insurance
'
941d. at 181.
'
951d. at 182.
.
9 Id. at 1S3.
197Id.
9
'Executive, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 183.
1991d.
2"Id. at 184.
201M.d
2021d. at 187.
203Executive, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 187.204Id. at 188.
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company since it knew its policy overlapped with the defendant's and it
had taken no steps to avoid the confusion.20 5 The court determined that
as a whole defendant's insurance policy was to serve either as excess
insurance or as minimal coverage for a loss on a pro rata basis if other
insurance applied to the claim.20 6
The court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment
based on the generally accepted rule that primary insurance should be
exhausted before excess insurance must pay.0 7 Executive Risk
Specialty Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 106 F. Supp. 2d 181 (Dist.
Mass. 2000).
State Concerns Regarding the Quality of Health Care
May Not Be Preempted By Federal Statute
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, held liability
and independent review provisions of the defendant's Insurance Code
(the Code) were not preempted by federal statute because the
provisions allowed suit only for health services rendered, not for
disputes over coverage.2 03 The court held also that the anti-indemnity
and anti-retaliation provisions of the Code were not preempted because
each addressed state concerns for the quality of health care.209 The
court, however, severed certain provisions from the Code and held they
were preempted because the state legislature wished to give them effect
in governing the quality of health care.
Plaintiff insurance companies challenged defendant's state
legislation regulating managed health care.211 Defendant first
contended plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the liability
provisions of the Code because plaintiffs had not suffered injury.2 1 2
Plaintiffs responded, and the court agreed they had standing because
the liability provisions of the Code exposed them to both private suits
2051d. at 188-89.206Id. at 189.2071d
203Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526, 540 (51h Cir. 2000).2091d.
21Old.
211d. at 531.2121d.
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and regulation by defendant.213 The court reasoned the liability
provisions of the Code did not include claims based on denial of
medical services, but rather claims that a physician was negligent and
imposed vicarious liability on managed care providers for the
negligence. 2
14
Plaintiffs next asserted that the anti-indemnification and anti-
retaliation provisions of the Code should be preempted.215 The anti-
retaliation provision prohibited a managed care organization from
refusing to renew a physician's contract for providing necessary
treatment. 216 The anti-indemnification provision stated that a managed
care organization could not include an indemnification clause in a
physician's contract.217 The court determined the anti-retaliation and
anti-indemnification clauses of the Code were not preempted by federal
statute because they dealt with quality of health care at the state
level. 21
8
Finally, the court reasoned certain provisions of the Code should
be severed and, thus, preempted by federal statute.2 1 9 However, the
court noted the severability of the provisions rested with the state
legislature. 220 The court denied the petition for panel rehearing and the
petition for en bane rehearing, concluding although the severed
provisions concerned quality of health care decisions and would not be
preempted under the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act,
the state legislature would give effect to these provisions making them
preempted under federal statute.221 Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas
Dep 't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526 (5" Cir. 2000).
213Corporate Health Ins., 215 F.3d at 53 1.
2
'
41d. at 534.2151d. at 536.216Id.
2 17Id.
218Corporate Health Ins., 215 F.3d at 537.
2
'
9 d. at 540.0id.
2id
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MALPRACTICE
Plaintiff Cannot Bring Wrongful Life Suit
For Negligent Misdiagnosis
The Court of Appeals of Texas held although a plaintiff could not bring
a wrongful life suit against a physician for a negligent misdiagnosis, the
plaintiff could sue under malpractice.
222
Following x-rays and CT scans, plaintiffs gastroenterologist
diagnosed her with terminal cancer.223 She prepared for her death by
giving away valuable personal possessions, euthanising her dog, and
making funeral arrangements.224 Plaintiffs ensuing treatments resulted
in weight loss and marked weakness. 225 When plaintiff found out she
had been misdiagnosed, she brought suit against the gastroenterologist
for medical malpractice.226 Plaintiff claimed defendant breached the
standard of care, causing her physical pain, emotional anguish, and
economic loss.
227
The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment,
holding Texas did not recognize a cause of action for wrongful life, and
plaintiffs economic injuries were not proximately caused by the
defendant's misdiagnosis.
228
On appeal, the court found plaintiff had stated a cause of action for
medical malpractice, not wrongful life.229 The court stated if plaintiff
could show that her emotional anguish, physical pain, and medical
expenses resulted from defendant's negligence then plaintiff was
entitled to recovery. 230 The court addressed whether the misdiagnosis
was a proximate cause of plaintiffs economic loss. 231 To determine
222Wyatt v. Rolando, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 5900, at *1 (Tex. App. 2000).
3d. at *1.
224id at *2
22Id.
226Wyatt, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 5900, at *3.2271d
228Id. at *4, *7.
2291d. at *7.
2301d.
231Wyatt, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 5900, at *12.
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proximate cause, the court looked to cause in fact and foreseeabilityY2
Although plaintiff raised an issue of fact as to whether the misdiagnosis
was a cause in fact of her suffering from economic loss, the court found
her economic injuries did not directly result from the misdiagnosis.2 33
It stated a physician's liability extended only to physical injuries
resulting from the misdiagnosis. 234 The court found plaintiff's
economic injuries were not within the scope of harm which defendant
should have predicted.235
The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision denying
plaintiff recovery for economic loss resulting from her misdiagnosis,
but remanded the case for deliberation of plaintiffs claim of negligent
misdiagnosis under a malpractice theory.23 1 Wyatt v. Longoria, 2000
Tex. App. LEXIS 5900 * (Tex. App. 2000).
A Physician Is Not Liable For Medical Malpractice Where a
Physician-Patient Relationship Does Not Exist
The Court of Appeals of Ohio held a physician was not liable for
medical malpractice in the absence of an established physician-patient
relationship, specifically where the physician was never consulted
regarding the patient's condition.237
Plaintiff visited Akron City Hospital's (the Hospital) maternal-
fetal center for a prenatal visit.238 She was first seen by a third-year
resident physician who ordered an ultrasound and a Non-Stress Test.
239
The tests were then reviewed by a perinatologist who later sent the
patient to the labor and delivery department.: 4 ° A second resident-
physician performed a physical examination and Contraction Stress
Test and conferred with a senior resident-physician regarding the test
2321d. (citing Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 477 (Tex.
1995%3Id. 
at *12, *17.
234Id. (citing Glenn v. Prestegord, 456 S.W.2d 901,902 (Tex. 1970)).
235Id. at *19.
236 Wyatt, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 5900, at *1.
2 37Lownsbury v. VanBuren, 2000 Ohio App. Lexis 3444, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. August 2,
2000).2Id. at *1.
2391d. at *2.240ld
"
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results. 241 Based on the results, the senior resident-physician released
the patient home.242 The next morning a reviewing physician agreed
with the interpretation of the test results by the senior resident-
physician. 43 Approximately four days later, the patient gave birth to a
severely brain damaged child. 244 The patient subsequently filed suit
against the supervising physician and obtained medical experts who
asserted the newborn would not have suffered permanent neurological
damage if labor had been induced earlier.
245
At no time did the resident physicians consult the supervising
physician, or ask him to interpret the patient's test results.2 46 In
addition, the supervising physician never examined or treated the
patient, nor did he know the patient was in the hospital.247
The patient's suit alleged: 1) the physician failed to supervise the
residents on duty; 2) the physician failed to ensure the requisite prenatal
care was provided to patient; and 3) the physician, as a result of his
failure to supervise, was responsible for injuries to the patient and
child.248
The trial court granted defendant physician's motion for summary
judgment citing a lack of genuine issues of material facts regarding the
patient's medical malpractice claim, and the patient appealed.249
The court of appeals held a duty of care does not exist in the
absence of a physician-patient relationship.250 The court reasoned the
physician-patient relationship arises out of an expressed or implied
contract that imposes a duty of requisite care on the physician.251 The
court also reasoned while a contractual relationship existed between the
patient and the hospital by the patient's signing of a consent form, no
similar relationship nexus existed between the supervising physician
and the patient.252 Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the
2 4 lid.
242Lownsbury, 2000 Ohio App. Lexis 3444, at *2.2431d.
244Id. at *3.24S51.
246Id.
247Lownsbury, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3444, at *3.
2 4 8
1d.
249Id. at *4.2101d at *8.
2511d. at *7.
252Lownsbury, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3444, at *11.
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judgment of the lower court.253 Lownsbuy. v. VanBuren, 2000 Ohio
App. Lexis 3444 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2000).
Wrongful Birth Recognized As Medical Malpractice Claim
The Supreme Court of Indiana held the tort of wrongful birth could also
be recognized as a medical malpractice claim.254
Plaintiff consulted a specialist physician about the condition of her
unborn child.255 The physician performed an ultrasound, which
revealed a defect in the brain.256 The physician told her staff to
schedule plaintiff for additional testing, but plaintiff was never
scheduled for these tests, and the report of the ultrasound was never
forwarded to her primary physician.257 Plaintiff therefore carried the
child, who was born with multiple birth defects, to term.211 The child
died four months later.259 Plaintiff filed a claim for wrongful birth,
alleging the consulting physician's failure to inform her of the
ultrasound results had deprived her of the right to terminate the
pregnancy.260 Defendant physician's insurance company filed a motion
for summary judgment, claiming Indiana did not recognize the tort of
wrongful birth.2
6
'
The trial court refused to grant summary judgment, holding
plaintiff could recover damages for (1) the extraordinary costs of
treating the baby, (2) additional medical or educational costs, (3)
medical and hospital expenses resulting from the physician's
negligence, (4) the physical pain the mother suffered, (5) loss of
consortium, and (6) the emotional pain the parents suffered.2 1,2 The
defendant appealed.
23Id. at *8.
24Bader v. Northeast Ind. Genetic Counseling, Inc., 732 N.E.2d 1212, 1216 (Ind. 2000).
255d. at 1215.
2Id.
257Id.
25Id.
259Bader, 723 N.E.2d at 1215.260Md.261id.
262Id.
263Id.
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The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, with the
exception of the emotional pain damages.264 The court reasoned the
plaintiff's claim of wrongful birth could be recognized as a medical
265
malpractice claim. The court stated plaintiff in a medical malpractice
case must show (1) duty owed to the plaintiff by defendant, (2) breach
of duty by the defendant, and (3) breach of duty as a proximate cause of
the injury sustained.266 The consulting physician owed a duty to
plaintiff to disclose the results of the ultrasound.267 The physician
failed to meet the applicable standard of care when she failed to
provide plaintiff with that result.268 Plaintiffs delivery of a deformed
child was a natural and probable result of the physician's breach of
duty.269 The injury in this case was not the child's defects, but rather
the lost opportunity to terminate the pregnancy.
270
The court therefore affirmed the trial court's decision that
damages should be measured by the medical costs and other costs
directly related to plaintiff s carrying of the baby to term, in addition to
the emotional distress damages.271 Bader v. Northeast Ind. Genetic
Counseling, Inc. 732 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind. 2000).
Comparative Negligence Inapplicable
When Patient's Alleged Negligence Occurred Prior to Treatment
The Supreme Court of Montana held comparative negligence jury
instructions are only appropriate in medical malpractice cases when the
patient's actions occurred contemporaneous with or subsequent to
treatment. 272
Plaintiff s daughter was treated by defendant physicians following
an asthma attack that occurred while she was horseback riding.2 73 The
daughter had a long medical history of breathing difficulties, was
2
"4Bader, 723 N.E.2d at 1215.2651d. at 1216.
2661d. at 1217.
2671d2611d. at 1218.269Bader, 723 N.E.2d at 1218.2701d.
2711d. at 1221.
272Harding v. Deiss and Sublette, 3 P.3d 1286, 1287 (2000).273Id.
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allergic to horses, and had asthma.274 Plaintiffs daughter went
horseback riding, experienced breathing difficulties and collapsed mid-
ride.275 Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) was performed at the
scene, and plaintiffs daughter was transported to the emergency room
where she was treated by one of the defendant physicians.2 6 The
following day plaintiffs daughter was transferred to another hospital
where the second defendant physician assumed supervision of her
care.2 77 Plaintiff's daughter died eight days post admission. 273
Following her daughter's death, plaintiff filed a wrongful death
and survivor action alleging medical malpractice.279 She claimed
defendant physicians were negligent in failing to intubate her daughter
upon her arrival at the emergency room.2 O Defendant physicians
maintained the plaintiffs daughter sustained oxygen deprivation as a
result of her asthma attack, which was directly related to her
negligently riding the horses when she knew she was allergic. 2e1 The
district court allowed the defendants to present argument and jury
instructions on comparative negligence.262 However, plaintiff was not
given the opportunity to discuss the issue of comparative negligence
during closing arguments, and repeatedly moved for a mistrial based
upon comments the defendants' counsel made during the opening
statement related to plaintiffs marriage history and her daughter's
delinquent behavior.25 3 A jury returned a verdict in defendants' favor
and the plaintiff appealed.23 4
The court found the district court erred by allowing defendant
physicians to present argument and jury instruction on comparative
negligence.285 Prior to this case the issues of comparative negligence in
medical malpractice suits had not been addressed in Montana. 6 The
274Id.
275Id.
276Id.
277Harding, 3 P.3d at 1287.27'Id
"
2791d at 1287-88.
2sId. at 128S.
2SId. at 1287-88.
2'2Harding, 3 P.3d at 1288.213Id. at 1290.
2-MId at 1287.
2mid.
'2l6 d. at 1288.
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court therefore relied primarily on case law from other jurisdictions. 287
The court noted the patient's conduct prior to seeking medical treatment
was merely a factor the physician should consider in treating the
patient, and should not facilitate a comparative negligence defense. 288
In addition, the court reasoned holding a patient liable for actions that
led to the patient's hospitalization was inconsistent with the parties'
normal expectations.
289
Having concluded the district court erred when it allowed a jury
instruction on comparative negligence, the Supreme Court of Montana
reversed the trial courts ruling. 29 Harding v. Deiss and Sublette, 3P.3d
1286 (Mont. 2000).
Where Evidence From Expert Testimony
Is Sufficient to Prove Defendant Adhered to the Standard of Care,
A Jury's Findings Should Not Be Disturbed
The Court of Appeals of Ohio held expert testimony presented by
defendant was sufficient to demonstrate the defendant's agents
measured up to the standard of care, and therefore a jury verdict should
stand. 291
Administratrix of the estate of decedent brought a cause of action
against University of Cincinnati Hospital (Cincinnati) alleging
defendant's agents deviated from acceptable standards of care and acted
negligently when intubating her.292 Decedent was diagnosed with
cancer of the thymus gland for which she underwent chemotherapy and293
radiation treatment. Due to complications from the radiation
treatment, her left lung had to be removed.294 After the surgery,
decedent's condition necessitated oxygen assistance, including several
intubations.295
2
retarding, 3 P.3d at 1288.
2'8Id. at 1289-90.2891d.
2 Id. at 1290-92.29 1Hughes v. University of Cincinnati Hospital, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4034, at *1
(2000) 922d
293 1d. at *2.
2 9 4
1d
295Id.
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In May 1994, decedent was admitted to Cincinnati for further
surgery on her lung.296  The surgery was unsuccessful and she was
subsequently transferred to the step-down unit of the hospital.297  On
June 21, 1994, while on the step-down unit, she developed respiratory
distress, necessitating intubation.298  She was felt to have been
successfully intubated after four initial unsuccessful attempts, and was
subsequently transferred to the intensive care unit, thirty-five yards
away, in what was felt to be stable medical condition. 299  After her
arrival in the intensive care unit, the physician covering the unit noted
that her heart rate had dropped precipitously, and he decided to
extubate and re-intubate her.3aO While he was preparing to re-intubate
decedent she developed cardiopulmonary arrest, leading to anoxic brain
injury.301 Decedent remained in a coma for five months and eventually
succumbed to respiratory failure secondary to pulmonary congestion. 
3 2
In the case that followed, both parties presented expert testimony,
and the Ohio Court of Claims entered judgment in favor of defendant,
finding plaintiff had failed to demonstrate, by a preponderance of
evidence, that defendant's agents had deviated from the standard of
care.303 Plaintiff appealed, alleging the decision of the Ohio Court of
Claims was against the manifest weight of evidence, since it
disregarded medical records and accepted the defendant's case which
rested on depositions and trial testimony of the defendant's
physicians.3 04 Furthermore, plaintiff claimed the trial court admitted
the testimony of experts who were not qualified pursuant to Ohio Rule
of Evidence 601(D).30 5 Evidence Rule 601(D) restricts testimony
related to liability in a medical malpractice claim to a person "licensed
to practice medicine and surgery by the state medical board or by the
licensing authority of the state," and who "devotes at least one-half of
2'9 Hughes, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4034, at *3.
97Id. at *4.
298d.
'9Id. at *5.
3
.1d. at *6.
30
'Hughes, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4034, at *6.3121d. at *7.3031d. at *11.
3051d.
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his or her professional time to the active clinical practice in his or her
field of licensure."
3 06
The Court of Appeals determined evidence presented by the
defendant, including expert testimony, was credible and competent and
was therefore sufficient to demonstrate the defendant's agents had not
deviated from the applicable standard of care.3 07 The court also found
the expert testimony presented at trial admissible under Evidence Rule
601(D) because the physician on whose testimony the plaintiff based
the trial court's error, was licensed to practice medicine in both Ohio
and Indiana.30 8 Furthermore, the physician was a specialist in
pulmonary and critical care and served as an attending physician in the
intensive care unit of the University of Cincinnati Hospital. 30 9 The
court also noted even if that particular physician had not been qualified,
plaintiff would not have been able to show she was prejudiced by his
testimony, since he had not been asked any questions related to
liability.31
0
The court therefore overruled the assignment of errors presented
by the administratrix, and affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of
the defendant hospital.31' Hughes v. University of Cincinnati Hospital,
2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4034 (2000).
Where Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exists Regarding a
Physician's Employment Status With a State Agency Granting of
Summary Judgment Is Premature
The Supreme Court of Mississippi held where issues of material fact
exists regarding a physician's employment status, summary judgment
may not be prematurely granted.31
Plaintiff-descendents filed suit against defendant physician
alleging medical malpractice in his treatment of the deceased.313 The
lower court granted summary judgment to defendant physician citing
306Hughes, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4034, at *28.3071d. at *14.
3'81d at *30.
3091d.31Old. at *31.31
'Hughes, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4034 at *30-31.
312Miller v. Meeks, 762 So.2d 301 (Miss. 2000).3131d. at 303.
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the applicable statute of limitation had run, but left the question of the
physician's employment status to the Supreme Court of Mississippi.
314
The record indicated the physician was employed under contract
with the University of Mississippi Medical Center (the Medical Center)
as a professor.315 The plaintiffs alleged although defendant-physician
was a professor at the Medical Center, he also engaged in private
practice while seeing patients at the University of Mississippi's
Outpatient Clinic (the Clinic).31 6 The plaintiffs further alleged
defendant-physician was not an employee of the Medical Center vAthin
the meaning of the Mississippi statute, which granted immunity to state
employees. 317  The defendant responded that he was not treating
patients as an independent contractor while at the Clinic because he
was, at all times, controlled by the Medical Center and its
association.318 The court determined the defendant's own affidavit and
income tax returns revealed that some of his earnings came from work
as a private practitioner, specifically as noted on defendant's Private
Practice Income Report.319
The court further found staff physicians at the Medical Center
were not solely compensated by the state, pursuant to an opinion cited
by the Mississippi Attorney General.320 Using a Virginia Supreme
Court ruling, the court employed a five-tier test to determine whether a
state-employed physician should be granted state immunity from
medical liability.32' First, the test weighed the nature of the function
performed by the employee.322 Second, the test weighed the extent of
the state's interest and involvement in the function.323 Third, the test
weighed the degree of control and direction exercised by the state over
the employee.324 Fourth, the test weighed whether the act complained
of involved the use of judgment and discretion.32" Finally, the test
3141d. at 303, 304.
3
"
51d. at 305.3161d.
3
'
7Miller, 762 So.2d at 305.
318Id. at 306.3191d. at 307.3 201d. at 309.321 d. at 310.
322Miller, 762 So.2d at 305.323Id
"3241d. at310.
32SId
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weighed whether the physician received compensation, either directly
or indirectly, from the patient for professional services rendered.326
The court declined to make a determination of defendant's
employment status due to inadequate information from the record.327
The court held summary judgment was premature given the unresolved
issues of material fact and the need for additional information pursuant
to the five-tier test.328 Therefore, the lower court's decision was
reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. 329 Miller v.
Meeks, 762 So.2d 302 (Miss. 2000).
NEGLIGENCE
Federal Statute Does Not Preempt Negligence Claim
Brought In State Court If Claim Refers
to Quality of Care Under a Health Plan
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas,
Dallas Division, held a claim for negligence brought in state court was
not preempted by federal statute, since plaintiff patients challenged the
quality of defendant's health plan and not the manner in which it was
administered.33 °
Plaintiff visited defendant's Urgent Care Clinic complaining of
abdominal pain.331 He was treated and released, but continued to suffer
severe pain. 2 Plaintiff was subsequently diagnosed with perforated
diverticulitis and underwent surgery to remove a portion of his colon.
333
Following surgery, plaintiff observed swelling in his scrotum.334 He
returned to the clinic and was ultimately diagnosed with necrotic
gangrene of the scrotum.335 Additional surgical and medical procedures
326id"
327Miller, 762 So.2d at 310.3281d. at 311.
329/d
"33ORice v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Texas, Inc., No. 3:99-CV-0714-L, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14062 (Tex. Sept. 28, 2000).33 1/d.
3 32Id. at *2.3331d.
334 d
"335Rice, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14062, at *2.
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were performed on plaintiff, but the pain continued and he developed
complications.
336
Plaintiff husband and wife subsequently filed suit in state court,
but defendants removed the action to federal court, contending the
claims were preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA).337 Plaintiffs moved to remand the case to state court,
asserting the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
matter. 33 Plaintiffs also contended that if no subject matter jurisdiction
existed, then defendant was responsible for costs and attorney's fees.
339
Plaintiffs further argued that removal to federal court was
improper since their claim was based on a state law theory of
negligence in the administration of health care.340 They did not assert
claims concerning the administration of defendant's health care plan.3
4 1
The court determined that careful reading of the plaintiffs'
allegations supported the contention that the claims were premised on
quality of care rather than on the health plan.342 The claims did not
relate to the administration or benefits under the plan.343  Plaintiffs
instead alleged negligent care by defendant in diagnosing and treating a
medical condition.34 Defendant argued plaintiffs' suit was directly
related to administration of benefits under the health care plan.
345
Defendant further asserted that the claims focused on cost containment
features of the plan that would deny plaintiff access to medical care.-
4 6
The court found that while the claims were perhaps related to such
benefits, it was not clear that plaintiffs were complaining about such
aspects of the plan.347  The court concluded the claims were not
preempted by ERISA because defendant failed to establish federal
3361d.
33729 U.S.C. §1001, et. seq.33
'Rice, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14062, at *3.
3391d. at *12.
3Id. at *4.
34'id
3 2Id. at *5. See Corporate Health Ins. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d 597, 620
(S.D.Tex. 1998).
343Rice, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14062, at *7.
3441d.
345Id.
341ld. at *8.
37Id. at *9.
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question jurisdiction.348 The court therefore remanded the case to the
state court, finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case.
Rice v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Texas, Inc., No. 3:99-CV-0714-L,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14062 (Tex. Sept. 28, 2000).
PRIVACY
Patient Lacks Standing to Invalidate a Statute
That Allows Physicians to Test For HIV Without Consent
Even Though Patient Visits a Physician Regularly
and May Be Tested Again In the Future
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held
plaintiff, who was tested for HIV without his knowledge or consent,
lacked standing to seek invalidation of an Illinois law granting
physicians discretion to test patients for HIV without their knowledge
or consent.349 Plaintiff did not satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement or
personal-stake requirement for standing.
350
Plaintiff suffered from a seizure disorder that required tri-weekly
office visits.351 At one visit plaintiff was asked if he would consent to
an HEIV test, and although he refused he found out at his next visit that
he had been tested and was HIV negative.352 Plaintiff subsequently
filed suit, calling the statute unconstitutional.353
The court reasoned that to assert standing the plaintiff had to show
the following: (1) an injury-in-fact; (2) a causal link between the
defendant's action and the injury; and that (3) a favorable decision
would likely redress the injury.35 The court agreed with the district
court that the plaintiff did not satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement
since his injuries were too abstract.3 55 It further found that plaintiffs
348Rice, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14062, at *12.349Donald J. Sierakowski v. Attorney General of the State of Illinois, 223 F.3d 440 (7th
Cir. 2000).3101d. at 442.3511d3521d.3531d.
354Sierakowski, 223 F.3d. at 442, 443.
3551d at 443.
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prospects of future injury were speculative and he therefore lacked a
personal stake in the outcome of the litigation. 356 The court stated that
since there was not mandatory testing, but rather testing at the will of
individual physicians, the statute was valid.357 Just because the plaintiff
had to visit a physician more often than others did not mean a physician
would automatically test more for IHIV s Accordingly, the judgment
of the lower court dismissing the suit was affirmed.3 s9 Donald J.
Sierakowski v. Attorney General of the State of Illinois, 223 F.3d 440
(7th Cir. 2000).
PROCEDURE
Where Two Theories of a Case Exist the Jury Must Be Given
Instructions Consistent With Both Theories
The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, held where a party's
theory of the case supports a jury instruction distinct from the opposing
supported theory of the case, both jury instructions should be given by
the court.3
60
Plaintiff presented to an emergency room with ankle pain
subsequent to falling.361 At the hospital plaintiff was diagnosed with an
ankle sprain.362 After more than a month of repeated follow-ups, as
instructed by the initial treating physician, plaintiff was diagnosed with
"acute vascular occlusion" by another physician and admitted to the
hospital.363 Subsequent to the admission, the physicians attempted to
clear obstructions that were interfering with blood flow." The
obstructions could not be cleared and plaintiffs foot was amputated.365
3561d. at 444.
357Id.
3581d.
359Sierakowski, 223 F. 3d. at 441.
311lTsoukas v. Lapid, 733 N.E. 2d 823 (III.App. Ct. 2000).3611d. at 826.
36 2Id .
36Id. at 827.
365Tsoukas, 733 N.E.2d at 827.
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Plaintiff then filed a complaint contending improper diagnosis and
treatment. 366 A jury found for the defendants. 36 7
On appeal, the court considered plaintiffs argument regarding
jury instructions.368 Both plaintiff and defendants argued conflicting
jury instructions of mitigation of damages and comparative negligence
respectively.369 At trial, only the comparative negligence instruction
was given to the jury.370
A comparative negligence instruction is appropriate where a
patient's negligence occurs before or at the same time as a physician's
malpractice.371 Likewise, a mitigation of damages instruction is
appropriate where a patient's negligence is subsequent to a physician's
malpractice.372 Since both parties offered theories to support both
instructions, the court erred in only instructing the jury on comparative
negligence.
373
The verdict form did not require the jury to explain whether it had
found for the defendants because they upheld standard of care or
because the plaintiffs negligence contributed greater than fifty percent
of the proximate cause of the injury.374 Since it was impossible to
delineate whether the jury found in favor of the defendants based upon
the theory of comparative negligence or mitigation of damages, the
decision of the trial court was reversed and the case remanded for a
new trial.375 Tsoukas v. Lapid, 733 NE.2d 823 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
.
6 ld. at 828.
3691d
"
370Tsoukas, 733 N.E.2d at 828.37 11d.
3721d"
3731d at 829.3741d375Tsoukas, 733 N.E.2d at 829
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PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Patient Must Prove By a Preponderance of the Evidence That Care
Rendered Falls Outside the Appropriate Standard of Care
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan,
Southern Division, held a plaintiff must show that rendered medical
care falls outside the appropriate standard of care to prevail on a claim
of negligence.
376
Plaintiff patient was admitted to defendant's medical center with a
history of vomiting blood and difficulty swallowing. 377 Tests were
performed and it was determined that plaintiff had esophageal
candidiasis and gastritis.378 Esophageal candidiasis is associated with
deterioration of a patient's immune system and is commonly found in
patients with diabetes, a history of steroid use, cancer, on
chemotherapy, or infected with IV.379 0
Plaintiff alleged a physician told her she was HIV positive.C0 The
physician reputed this allegation and stated he would never tell a
patient she had HIV before completing diagnosis through use of the
appropriate laboratory tests.38 1 The physician's testimony revealed he
did not recall expressly his conversation with the plaintiff, but noted it
would be against professional standards to diagnose a patient's
condition before properly ascertaining the condition.
382
The court found the physician's testimony credible and believed the
plaintiff misunderstood what was told to her by the physician in their
conversation.383  The court also found the tests conducted on the
plaintiff were the standard tests run on all patients with such infections
as those suffered by the plaintiff.384 The court reasoned the differences
3761ves v. United States, No. 98-CV-73048-DT (Mich. Aug. 16, 2000) (2000 U.S, Dist.
LEXIS 12998).
377Id. at *4.
3781d
"3791d.3SOId at *5.3SlVves, 2000 LEXIS 12998, at *5.
3 6i2d.
3131d. at *6.
39Id. at *7.
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between the plaintiffs and the physician's recollection of their
conversation was best explained by a breakdown in communication.
385
To prevail in this case, the plaintiff needed to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) the defendant owed plaintiff a
duty to render appropriate medical care; (2) the duty was breached; (3)
the plaintiff suffered injury; and (4) the injury was proximately caused
by the breach. 86 The court found defendant owed plaintiff a duty, but
none of the three remaining factors had been reached by a
preponderance of the evidence.387 Accordingly, the court ruled in favor
of defendant physician.388 Ives v. United States, No. 98-CV-73048-DT
(Mich. Aug. 16, 2000)(2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12998).
WRONGFUL LIFE
Where the Law of Negligence Will Not Hold Physicians Liable For
Damages They Did Not Cause, Wrongful Life Claim
Cannot Be Brought
The Supreme Court of Ohio held a child born with physical or other
handicaps could not bring a wrongful life claim where no causal
connection existed between the injury and the treating physicians389
Defendant physicians rendered pre-natal care to appellant's
wife. 390 Such pre-natal care included screening for birth defects.
391
Defendant physicians later failed to inform appellant and his wife of the
pre-natal test results, which indicated birth defects in the fetus.
392
Appellant's daughter was subsequently born with spina bifida, an
abnormal opening in the spinal canal.393 Appellants sued for medical
3851d. at *10.3
'
61ves, 2000 LEXIS 12998, at *12 (citing Carlton v. St. John Hosp., 182 Mich. App.
166, 451 N.W.2d 543 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam)); Accord, Theisen v. Knake, 236
Mich. App. 249,257, 599 NAV.2d 777 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999)(per curiam)).3871d at *13.3881d.
389 l-ester v. Dwivedi, 2000 Ohio LEXIS 2050, at 18 (Oh. Super. Ct. Sept. 6, 2000).
3'0Id at *4.3911d
3921d
3 931d. at *5.
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negligence. 394 Additionally, they asserted "wrongful life" claims on
behalf of their daughter.395 Both the trial and appellate courts granted
appellees' motion for judgment on the pleadings.3 96 Appellant
appealed.397
The Supreme Court of Ohio only considered whether the vrongful
life claims were sufficient to withstand appellees' motion for judgment
on the pleadings.398 Although appellants asserted an action for
wrongful life, the court determined such actions were effectively
medical negligence actions.399 The court analyzed the claims under
common law tort principles.40 0 To be successful, appellants had the
burden of proving liability based on breach, duty, causation and
damages, where such damages were the proximate cause of the
breach.401 The court therefore had to determine whether an individual
born with birth defects had suffered a legally compensable injury.40 2
The Court hesitated to rule in this area since it required passing
judgment regarding the value of being born versus being aborted.40 3
The case therefore turned on causation.404 It was undisputed that
appellant's daughter's condition occurred at or near the time of
conception.40 5 However, appellees neither caused nor could have cured
such a defect.40 6 Although appellant's wife contended she was
deprived of the right to make an informed decision to abort based upon
appellee's breach, the court found this fact distinguishable from the
daughter's claim of injury. 407
The court reasoned, pursuant to the law of negligence, appellee
physicians would not have been held liable for damages they did not
3 4Hester, 2000 Ohio LEXIS 2050, at * 4.351d. at *5.3 161d. at *2.397id.
3981d
"399Hester, 2000 Ohio LEXIS 2050, at *5.411Id. at *6.4 0lid.
412Id. at *8.4031d. at *9.4
'4Hester, 2000 Ohio LEXIS 2050, at *13.405ld.
4 0
s1d.
4171d. at *18.
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cause.40 8 Accordingly, the court affirmed judgment on the pleadings in
favor of appellee physicians. 409 Hester v. Dwivedi, 2000 Ohio LEXIS
2050 (OH. Super. Ct. Sept. 6, 2000).
4
°
3Hester, 2000 Ohio LEXIS 2050, at *15.4
"
9 1d at *20.
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